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Despite its undeniable “birth pangs,” the Eastern Partnership symbolizes 
a change of paradigms in the foreign policy of the EU, which, after the in-
ception of the Union for the Mediterranean in the summer of 2008, is now 
venturing on a new and qualitatively different approach to its eastern 
neighbourhood. Furthermore, five years after the enlargement of the EU 
this strategy creates a new situation in eastern Europe, and places its own 
approach to Russia on a firmer footing. 
The EU-Russia summit took place in Kha-
barovsk on 21-22 May. The result was 
rather meagre. The negotiations on a new 
partnership and cooperation agreement 
will continue. On 7 May 2009, in Prague, 
the EU adopted the “Eastern Partnership” 
strategy. It is designed to place EU rela-
tions with the eastern neighbouring states 
(Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus) and the 
Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia) on an improved and multilat-
eral level. In essence we are dealing with 
old wine in new bottles. What is new about 
the agreement is that the financial frame-
work has been increased by € 600 million. 
 
 
 
I 
How is the EU structuring 
its new eastern policy? 
The policy of the enlarged EU towards the 
eastern neighbouring states consists of 
two components. On the one hand, the EU 
27 is trying to conclude a new Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with 
Russia. On the other hand, relations with 
the other successor states of the Soviet 
Union have been redefined by the Eastern 
Partnership strategy, which is based on 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
It remains to be seen whether or not the 
two approaches can actually co-exist, since 
the negotiations with Russia have not 
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made much headway since 2006. Since the 
end of 2006 there has been little move-
ment in the relations between the Euro-
pean Union and Russia. Neither the Fin-
nish, the German nor the Portuguese 
Presidencies were able to secure a consen-
sus within the EU about the start of official 
negotiations with Moscow on a new treaty 
Agreement (PCA) of 1994 (in force since 
1997), which expired on 1 November 
2007. At first the EU member states found 
it impossible to reach agreement on the 
issue, and then the war in Georgia led to a 
deferral of the negotiations, which were 
not resumed during the French Presidency 
until December 2008. 
 
II 
What is the Eastern Part-
nership Trying to Achieve? 
more, it has a long-term goal of “complete 
define a number of co
ects. The Eastern Partner-
hip is compatible with the Central Asia 
The Eastern Partnership seeks to draw the 
reform-oriented countries closer to the EU, 
though without extending a promise of ac-
cession. Above all it seeks to promote and 
encourage the political and economic re-
forms in its six partner states. Further-
visa liberalization.” Ever since the central 
European states joined the Schengen 
agreement in December 2007, the visa is-
sue has been one of the most symbolic 
problems at the EU’s eastern border. There 
will also be enhanced cooperation with re-
gard to energy security, and this will ex-
tend to Central Asia. Finally, the proposals 
operation areas such 
as the promotion of 
democracy, support 
for the rule of law, 
the prevention of 
migration, the en-
couragement of 
trade and tourism, 
the improvement of 
transportation in-
frastructure, coop-
eration in the area 
of the environment, 
and student ex-
change pro-
grammes. Further-
more, the project 
welcomes participa-
tion by international 
financial institu-
tions and private 
donors. In this way 
the EU hopes to be 
able to involve other partners such as mul-
tinational energy corporations in order to 
make progress with specific energy and 
infrastructure projects.  
 
Russia has also been invited to participate 
in certain proj
s
strategy, which was adopted during the 
German EU Presidency in 2007, and to-
gether with the mandate to renegotiate the 
PCA with Russia constitutes in outline the 
EU’s eastern policy. However, hitherto, on 
account of the war in Georgia in the sum-
mer of 2008 and the gas crisis in January 
2009, the negotiations with Russia have 
not produced any tangible results. It is 
currently impossible to predict when a 
new PCA with Russia will materialize. 
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III 
How did the Eastern  
Partnership come about? 
The largest single enlargement of the 
E  
with the 
mber 2004 as a result of the 
Orange Revolution” in Kyiv. The peaceful 
always been concerned 
 strengthen EU policy towards its east-
uropean Union occurred on 1 May 2004
accession of ten new members. 
Three years later they were joined by Ro-
mania and Bulgaria. This put an end to the 
division of Europe fifteen years after the 
pivotal events of 1989. The question then 
arose of how this enlarged Europe should 
deal with the eastern neighbouring states 
for whom EU membership was not an is-
sue. The answer was the “European 
Neighbourhood Policy,” or ENP. The EU 
Commission’s strategy envisaged the idea 
of cooperation that did not involve institu-
tional ties.  
 
However, this strategy was rendered obso-
lete in Dece
“
revolution in Ukraine made it clear that 
people in the eastern neighbouring coun-
tries wanted to be part of Europe, and 
were prepared to fight for that goal. At the 
same time the pivotal events in Ukraine 
meant that the Kremlin’s strategy of estab-
lishing an alternative structure to Euro-
pean integration in the post-Soviet space 
had come to grief. 
 
Since Poland joined the EU in 2004, Polish 
governments have 
to
ern neighbours, though they made a clear 
distinction between Russia and the other 
successor states of the Soviet Union. The 
proposed “Union for the Mediterranean,” 
which President Nicolas Sarkozy imple-
mented in such a resolute manner during 
the French Presidency, provided an oppor-
tunity to strengthen EU policymaking with 
regard to the eastern neighbouring states. 
The term “Eastern Partnership” was ini-
tially introduced to the EU Council as a 
Swedish-Polish initiative early in 2008. A 
connection between the approval of the 
Union for the Mediterranean, the start of 
PCA negotiations with Russia, and the 
Eastern Partnership is difficult to demon-
strate on the basis of the documents avail-
able to date. However, the timing of the 
three important EU decisions certainly 
suggests that they were interlinked. 
 
IV 
What are the priorities of 
German foreign policy? 
I
eig y 
was the Ger
in 
e fields of research, education and cul-
ssia was to be coop-
ration in the field of energy policy. Apart 
n Berlin a speech by the Minister for For-
n Affairs on European eastern polic
man response to the Union for 
the Mediterranean mooted by the French. 
In fact po licy on Russia predominated in 
the proposals by Federal Foreign Minister 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who took his 
bearings from the eastern policy of Willy 
Brandt. Steinmeier favoured a new agree-
ment with Russia which contained clear 
signals that it was welcome in Europe.  
 
Medium-term goals were a free trade area, 
an energy partnership, close relations 
th
ture, and an increase in social and human 
interaction. Furthermore, the possibility of 
closer cooperation within the framework of 
the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) was to be put on the agenda, ini-
tially in the civilian sphere and in the field 
of disaster relief, and later with regard to 
the joint deployment of peacekeeping and 
stabilization forces. 
 
However, the core element of the strategic 
partnership with Ru
e
from this Russia was to be included in an 
international regulatory structure which 
construed energy security as a partnership 
between producing, transit and consumer 
states. Russia itself seems to have called 
this kind of cooperation into question dur-
ing the gas crisis in January 2009. The 
declaration of intent concerning the mod-
ernization of the gas pipeline system, 
which the EU Commission and Ukraine 
signed in April 2009, points to a greater  
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level of cooperation with Ukraine which 
does not take Russian interests into ac-
count. 
 
The fact that the German Chancellor took 
part in
G
preoccupied with Russia. Germany clearly 
wishes to encourage Russia and the states 
included in the Eastern Partnership to 
move towards the EU. 
 
V 
What does Warsaw want? 
The initial emphasis on Russia soon pro-
v
more active
of EU eastern policy was crucial 
 the revival of Polish-German coopera-
ctivi-
rship a completely 
ifferent slant, and the gas crisis in Janu-
at the summit. Po-
nd will no doubt return to the issue dur-
oked a response from the proponents of a 
 neighbourhood policy, and, 
during a private visit to Polish foreign 
minister Radek Sikorski in April 2008, 
Steinmeier was confronted with Polish 
plans for an East European Union. It was 
to include not only Ukraine. Moldava and, 
when the time was ripe, Belarus, but also 
the Caucasus countries Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. Polish interests in energy 
supplies from this region played an impor-
tant role in the decision to proceed with 
the plan. 
 
The division of labour with regard to the 
definition 
to
tion. Poland had managed to convince the 
Swedish government that an Eastern 
Europe Union was a good idea, and that it 
was a way of bridging the divide between 
old and new members. For Swedish foreign 
minister Carl Bildt this was a good oppor-
tunity to hone his profile as an EU foreign 
policy specialist and as a potential succes-
sor of Javier Solana. The breakthrough 
came after the Poles had managed to con-
vince the Lithuanians to give up their op-
position to the negotiating mandate for 
Russia. On 26 April 2009 the EU foreign 
ministers adopted the Polish proposals for 
the Eastern Partnership and gave the EU 
Commission the go-ahead to commence 
negotiations  with Russia on a new part-
nership and cooperation agreement. 
The Eastern Partnership was in first in-
stance designed to prevent the centre of 
gravity of the EU’s neighbourhood a
ties from shifting to the south, and is the 
price for the support given to the Union 
for the Mediterranean, which was initiated 
in Paris on 13 July 2008. However, from 
the very beginning the Eastern Partner-
ship was conceived within the framework 
of existing EU structures and in contrast 
to the French proposals was very even-
handed and not at all controversial. The 
Swedish-Polish proposals envisaged en-
hanced cooperation with the eastern 
neighbouring states based on the existing 
EU neighbourhood policy strategy. It 
meant that from the start it received sup-
port in all the EU capitals which were in 
favour of a compromise in the run-up to 
the French Presidency. 
 
The war in Georgia in the summer of 2008 
gave the Eastern Partne
d
ary 2009 led to the inclusion of an energy 
policy component. It remains to be seen 
whether the EU’s energy policy compe-
tence will be strengthened and whether or 
not the proponents of bilateral cooperation 
with Russia, i.e. Germany, Italy, Greece 
and Bulgaria, will be prepared to transfer 
their advantageous energy policy respon-
sibilities to the EU. The European Parlia-
ment has now called for the development 
of a strategy designed to improve the en-
ergy security of the EU. 
 
The Polish government was very pleased 
with what was achieved 
la
ing its own EU Presidency in 2011. 
 
VI 
How are the EU and Russia 
going to make progress? 
p  
none of the  . 
It is true that the PCA is automatically 
rolonged on a yearly basis as long as
parties decides to terminate it
The repeated failure to begin the negotia-
tions and the gas crisis in January 2009  
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larifying its own position. A few 
sia ad-
s. Fur-
e 
redefined, via the reshaping of trade policy 
within the WTO framework, which has still 
not been finalized, to aspects of security 
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have become symbols of the current crisis 
in the relations between the EU and Rus-
sia. The real reasons for this crisis lie 
much deeper, and their dimensions are 
much larger than was initially assumed. 
Different mutual perceptions seem 
to be of particular significance. On 
the one hand, in the wake of the 
gas crises and the recognition of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Rus-
sia is perceived by the majority of 
the EU states as being rather 
problematical. On the other hand, 
after the Putin era and despite the 
economic crisis, Russia once again 
sees itself as a world power und 
wishes to be treated as such. 
 
For all these reasons the enlarged 
EU needs to reshape its relation-
ship with Russia
ti
has profoundly changed the way 
the EU thinks. And as a result of 
the historical experience of these 
countries, three of which were in-
voluntarily part of the Soviet Un-
ion for decades, the EU has be-
come more critical of Russia.  
 
Thus, whilst the EU needs to rede-
fine its interest in Russia, the lat-
ter is in the middle of a proces
c
years ago EU politicians assumed 
that Russia was in the middle of a 
difficult transformation process, 
the goal of which was supposedly 
the adoption of “fundamental 
Western values” and a strategic 
partnership with the “West.” The 
Russia of the 21
st century, which 
has benefited from energy export 
revenues, is not prepared to com-
ply with the preconceptions of the 
EU and is looking for its own way o
ing with the future. The current economic 
crisis, which has affected Rus
versely, will not change this proces
thermore, the “reset” strategy of the new 
American administration actually sanc-
tions the 
f deal-
foreign policy of the Putin era.  
The future of the Eurasian continent de-
pends on how the mutual relationship de-
velops. There are numerous challenges on 
the way, ranging from cooperation in th
area of energy policy, which needs to be 
policy such as principles and procedures 
for the joint regulation of international 
crises. The EU and Russia should not forgo 
the opportunity to enhance their partner- 
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ship. Over the last ten years there have 
been double-digit growth rates in the EU’s 
trade with its eastern neighbours, and the 
significance of Russia for the EU economy 
as a whole surpassed that of North Amer-
ica some years ago. On the other hand 
there is an inescapable need to modernize 
Russia as it moves into the 21
st century. 
Who would be the best partner for Russia 
in this regard? 
 
For the EU the negotiations leading to a 
new PCA with Russia constitute a test of 
its foreign po
th
Georgia and the gas conflict in recent 
weeks have placed a severe strain on EU-
Russian relations.  
 
VII 
What are the conse-
quences of the war in 
The ry 
sudd ar 
in Georgia erupted. Russia accused Geor-
gia of having sta and re-
hment of diplomatic relations be-
een Turkey and Armenia will prompt it 
a great disservice to 
e status quo policy pursued by Russia 
Georgia? 
 international situation changed ve
enly on 8 August 2008 when the w
rted the war 
sponded with a full range of military op-
tions. The U.S. and some of its European 
allies supported Georgia and President Sa-
kashvili and asserted that Russia was 
guilty of aggression. If we disregard the 
media campaigns, which were reminiscent 
of the age of the east-west conflict, it 
needs to be said that the war led to a se-
ries of security policy decisions which in 
terms of foreign policy have tied down the 
actors involved to this day. For the first 
time the EU acted as a mediator between 
an ally of the U.S. and Russia. As a result 
of the intervention of French President 
Sarkozy, it arranged for a ceasefire and 
dispatched a mission which has secured 
its observance to this day. EU involvement 
in the Caucasus during the French Presi-
dency changed the perceptions of the Rus-
sian political elite. For the first time since 
it was founded, the EU played the role of a 
regional peacemaking power. To this day 
Russian diplomacy pigeonholes the EU as 
an “international organization” that is on 
the same level as the OSCE and the Coun-
cil of Europe. It is thus only logical that 
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov re-
jects the Eastern Partnership as an at-
tempt “to extend the EU’s sphere of influ-
ence.” 
 
The EU’s attitude to the Caucasus will also 
change. The opening of the border and the 
establis
tw
to define a policy which transcends the 
purely geographical division into North 
and South Caucasus. 
 
On the Russian side, the recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independ-
ent states has done 
th
and previously the Soviet Union for dec-
ades. The consequences with regard to the 
North Caucasus are currently difficult to 
assess. On top of this the mingling of the 
policy of recognition in the Caucasus with 
the Kosovo issue has been more detrimen-
tal than beneficial to Russia’s interna-
tional room for manoeuvre. It has also had 
a negative effect on EU policy in  Kosovo.   
 
VIII 
What are the conse-
quences of the gas crisis? 
At th con-
flict between Russia and Ukraine seemed 
to  
an imperia
e beginning of the year the gas 
 confirm old prejudices about Russia as
list power and fears about its 
reliability as a source of energy supplies. 
In some EU states such as Slovakia and 
Bulgaria and in the Balkan states people 
sat for days on end in unheated apart-
ments. Russia and Ukraine blamed each 
other for what had happened, and Chancel-
lor Merkel reminded Russian Prime Minis-
ter Vladimir Putin of the promise he had 
given in 2005 that he would not use en-
ergy supplies in order to apply pressure 
on an international level.  
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rly visible in 
e EU. This is shown, for example, by the 
 and technical 
daptation, and on the other hand the EU 
energy 
ector. In Poland, for example, there are 
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In the midst of the crisis the Polish foreign 
minister Sikorski devoted himself to the 
EU energy strategy, and sought to create a 
new EU energy policy. 
mooted in 2006, which had become known 
under the name “Energy NATO,” was re-
furbished and adopted by the EU energy 
ministers at a special session in Budapest 
on 25 January 2009. Greater cooperation 
between the EU member states will lead to 
more energy solidarity in the EU and mean 
that Europe is better prepared to deal with 
a disruption in supplies of the kind ex-
perienced in January 2009.  
 
No matter whether Ukraine or Russia was 
responsible for the crisis at the beginning 
of 2009, its effects are clea
th
EU declaration on the southern corridor, 
which was adopted after the “Eastern 
Summit” in Prague on 8 May 2009. In ad-
dition to the signatories themselves, it was 
attended by representatives from Turk-
menistan and Kazakhstan. 
 
On the one hand it has proved possible to 
create more energy security within the EU 
by means of coordination
a
decision to build the Nabucco pipeline, 
which is designed to bring gas to Europe 
from the Caspian Sea area, from Iraq, 
Turkmenistan and perhaps Iran through 
the middle of Turkey by circumventing 
Russia, is a step towards greater inde-
pendence of Russian gas supplies.  
 
Furthermore, the EU has granted certain 
states additional financial aid designed to 
promote the modernization of the 
s
plans to construct an LNG terminal at 
Swinoujscie, which could also serve the 
needs of Germany. Finally, the planning 
permission procedure for the Baltic pipe-
line is making little headway in the Swed-
ish courts, having been held up by envi-
ronmental regulations, and might still take 
years. On top of this there is the global 
economic crisis, which has witnessed a 
decline in the prices for energy supplies 
and has led to a reassessment of all in-
vestments in the energy sector. 
 
IX 
What should the EU do 
better in future? 
Th r-
sh s 
in over which 
has been caused by the ratify-
opted 
y the energy ministers on 25 January 
t and work-
g environment of Western companies in 
e future shape of the Eastern Partne
ip depends on whether the EU succeed
coming the current crisis, 
 process of 
ing the Treaty of Lisbon. Without this 
treaty the EU will find it difficult to en-
hance its influence on the transformation 
states in its eastern neighbourhood. 
 
The gas crisis at the start of 2009 sharp-
ened the debate about energy security 
within the EU itself. The decision ad
b
2009 was a long-awaited step in this direc-
tion. At the most recent energy summit on 
24 April 2009, which was organized by the 
Bulgarians, the EU partners, the Russians, 
the Americans and the Black Sea littoral 
states, Russian President Medvedev pre-
sented a new energy strategy. 
 
The new treaty is designed to replace the 
old Energy Charter, which in the early 
1990s regulated the investmen
in
the energy sector. Russia subsequently re-
fused to ratify the Charter because it con-
sidered that it gave the West an unfair ad-
vantage. During Putin’s presidency con-
tracts with several Western energy com-
panies were renegotiated with the help of 
some rather dubious methods. Medvedev’s 
proposals revitalized the issue, and came 
at a time when the centrepiece of the EU’s 
energy policy was beginning to look rather 
shaky. The Nabucco pipeline is running 
out of suppliers. Azerbaijan has turned to 
Moscow, Turkmenistan to China, and for 
security policy reasons Iran is currently 
not a serious contender for security policy 
reasons. Thus in shaping its energy policy 
the EU must proceed in a more sophisti-
cated way and should coordinate both the  
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 with Russia. As yet 
e Russians have not displayed a great 
 it is true that the 
r-sighted EU strategy already existed in 
e lack of interest in a new 
 central issue will 
robably be the simultaneous development 
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Eastern Partnership and the PCA with 
Russia. It is unclear who will gain the up-
per hand in this area. 
 
The negotiations on a new PCA will take a 
long time, not only on account of the cri-
ses in the relationship
th
deal of interest in a new PCA. While it is 
certainly true that the negotiating process 
has begun, many years may elapse before 
a viable document actually materializes. 
However, Russia’s delayed WTO member-
ship may put additional pressure on its 
negotiating strategy, since it provides an 
opportunity to determine regulations in 
the economic sphere. 
 
Hitherto the major impetus for the shaping 
of EU eastern policy has always been of 
external origin. While
fa
the shape of a Polish-Swedish proposal, 
external pressure clinched the matter. 
Thus the war in Georgia and the recogni-
tion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia called 
for a suitable response. Without this deci-
sive impetus the Eastern Partnership 
would probably never have been adopted 
in this form.  
The rejection of the Eastern Partnership by 
Russia and th
 
 
binding PCA with the EU will also lead to 
a shift in the priorities of the EU’s eastern 
policy. It is due to Russian Prime Minister 
Putin and the gas crisis that the EU’s en-
ergy strategy has begun to face up to the 
facts. It seems unlikely that the Baltic 
pipeline will be stopped. However, the 
construction of the Nabucco pipeline 
would lead to a shift of emphasis in east-
ern policy. The next gas crisis will show 
whether or not the EU has learned any-
thing in the meantime. 
 
In the years ahead the
p
of the PCA with Russia and the Eastern 
Partnership. The EU strategy will involve 
enhancing relations with its neighbours to 
the east and placing relations with Russia 
on a new footing. In the shaping of a 
“European Eastern policy” Poland and 
Germany will have a key role to play.  For 
this reason in the Germany-Poland-Russia 
triangle will be of crucial importance for 
the forthcoming development of relations 
between the EU and Russia. 
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